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ence, particularly new stretches or newly measured ones,
is set by the balancing of gains from a formal set of
parameters against losses. The losses are not slight if the
formal model conceals revealing deviations by impound-
ing them in anonymous variance, or if modifying any
part of the model involves long scrutiny and heavy costs.
When the changing economic reality is teaching us some-
thing new at a rapid rate, the costs of formalizing prior
limited knowledge by dint of a variety of assumptions
(substitutes for knowledge that is lacking) may be too
heavy, and the gain from having results amenable to
formal tests of uncertain relevance may be too slight.
3. RECENT TRENDS IN QUANTITATIVE
ECONOMIC RESEARCH
Quantitative economic research on the broader aspects
of the national economy, dealing with the growth and
structure of national product, its origin and distribution,
is dependent upon a supply of primary data sufficient
for a variety of meaningful economic measures. These,
combined with complementary data and relevant hy-
potheses, can then be interpreted and eventually serve
as a foundation for at least partial generalizations and
tentative predictions. In turning to trends in quantitative
research of this broad type since World War II in this
country, I must limit the discussion to studies that em-
ploy national product and related aggregates, largely for
the analysis of short- and long-term changes in the per-
formance of national economies. This performance is
viewed in relation to the commonly accepted goals, e.g.,
adequate growth, freedom from disturbing fluctuations,
equitable distribution of gains, the least painful distribu-
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tion of losses, and the like. Much of what canbesaid of
this type of quantitative research on the broader aggre-
gates• for national economies (and their major com-
ponents) applies equally to quantitative research dealing
with some important economic institutions that are part
of the framework of national or with activ-
ities of the major policy agencies, or with the special
problems imposed by internationalrelations(rather
than viewing the "rest of the world" as a minor sector in
the national product totai). But since my knowledge of
these other areas is slight, I shall limit rpy review to the
field with which I am more, if not fUlly, familiar—a field
to which the National Bureau has contributed much in
the past, and the prospects and problems of which must
be considered in any discussion of the National Bureau's
programs for the future.
Acceleration in the Supply of Primary Data, Economic
Measures, and the Pace of Quantitative Research
A look back over the period since the middle 1940's,
and cothparing it with the interwar period, conveys a
strong impression of an acceleration in the supply of
primary data, of economic measures, and of the pace of
quantitative research related to the national economy, in
this country and elsewhere. Output of primary data is
not easily measured, because reduction to comparable
units is feasible only for the most elementary types of
information (e.g., the number of people counted). This
isalso true of the generation of economic measures,
which, as already indicated, may be complex amalgams
of primary data with economic concepts and theories,
and with wide quality and significance differentjals. As
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to pace of quantitative research, some measure of input
and gross output can be secured, if quality differentials
are but the effort may not be worthwhile,
and in any case is not feasible here. I am thus limited to
impressions, supported by some evidence.
Let me begin with the most telling, set of economic
measures, that of national product, its components, and
the related totals, for this country. The initial study by
the National Bureau in the early 1920's made a sig-
nificant contribution inattemptingtoprovide some
answers to the majoruestion of the day, the distribution
of income; and this contribution marked a substantial
advance over the earlier work of several individual
scholars. The notable expansion of the National Bureau's
work and indeed of any work in this field in this country
did not come until the 1930's. It was largely in response
to the acute need to take stock of an economy afflicted
by a major depression and to a changing emphasis on
the problems of investment and savings generated by
the writings of John Maynard Keynes.
But the major acceleration in the supply of continuous
estimates of national product, in increasing detail and
with an increasingly solid foundation in avarietyof
primary data, began when estimation was taken over by
the Department of Commerce; and when, soOn after
World War II, the results became a frequently used guide
to public and much of private policy. This acceleration
was stimulated by the increasing contribution of economic
scholarship outside the government, which generated the
flow-of-funds approach, the input-output analysis, new de-
vices for sampling and summarization, and a host of other
intellectual innovations that served to facilitate and to
stimulate an ever-increasing flow of economic measures,
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produced inrisingproportions bythegovernment
agencies. To be sure, this type of acceleration can hardly
be measured by percentage rates of increase: after all,
when one starts with nothing or very little, the initial
proportional increase can be enormous and cannot be
exceeded later. Nor does any government initiate eco-
nomic measures that have not already been explored,
and their worth demonstrated, by individual scholars or
research agencies that are the main carriers of innovative
research. The acceleration of which I speak was an
enormous increase in the volume of acceptable economic
measures, in. increasing detail for any given time and in
growing coverage of the historical experience. In this
case, the possible economies of scale, in terms of facilitat-
ing significant economic research, are so great that linear
measures of quantities and proportions are hardly ap-
propriate. Since national product estimates are closely
linked with other economic measures that may have an
independent value for other uses (price indexes, money
supply, labor force and employment, and the like), ac-
celeration in the supply of measures relating to national
product and its significant components must have meant
acceleration in the supply of other economic measures as
well.
What was true of the United States, when one com-
pares the post-World War II situation with that of the
interwar period, appears to have been true of other
countries that we now classify as economically devel-
oped. The assumption of official responsibility for con-
tinuous, detailed, and acceptable estimation of national
product and its components has been largely a World
War II or post-World War II phenomenon in most de-
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veloped countries of the world.4 The extension of official
income estimation was even more striking for the less
developed countries of the world. Many of them attained
political independence only after World War II, and
their governments then faced the problems of assuring
adequate levels of performance and growth of the econ-
omy, in the concern for which even approximate esti-
mates of aggregate product and its major components
seemed indispensable. The explosive expansion in the
supply of national product measures the world over in
the post-World War II years can be seen by comparing
the summaries of these estimates by the United Nations
in the late 1940's or early 1950's with what is available
in the massive Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics
for recent years; or by comparing the latter with the
League of Nations publications in the 1930's. A similar
explosive increase occurred in the supply of data on the
balance of international payments in the international
compendia of the IMF; on population in the Demo-
graphic Yearbook of the United Nations; on labor force
in the publications of the ILO; on agriculture in those of
the FAO; and on education and health in the yearbooks
of other UN agencies. Even the Communist countries,
after a temporary blackout, began to release more mean-
ingful economic measures after World War II. Com-
munist China and a few of its satellites are significant
exceptions. There, if an increased supply is produced
Previously an occasional elaborate estimate had been prepared,
but without a continuous follow-up. See Paul Studenski, The income
of Nations, New York, New York University Press, 1958, the first 150
pages of which cover the developments before World War I; see also
the United Nations,StatisticalOffice, National Income Statistics,
1938—47, New York, 1948, and National Income Statistics, 1938—1948,
New York, 1950.
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by and available to the government, it is withheld from
circulation. The exception is of some significance to the
relation between supply of economic measures produced
under governmental auspices and quantitative research.
If we accept the impression of a marked acceleration
after World War II in the supply of national product
estimates and of a wide variety of related economic
measures, occurring both in this country and in many
other countries, two questions arise.
First, does this also mean an acceleration in the supply
of primary data—over and beyond the usual accretion
associated with continuation of the old patterns of cen-
sus-taking, periodic reporting,etc.; or doesit mean
merely more intensive reworking of the stock of primary
data growing at the rate prevailing in the earlier years?
In a sense it does not matter which answer is valid.
Primary data existed before, but may not have been
utilized as raw material for meaningful economic meas-
ures. This situation was not untypical of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, when data were being
published in census volumes and statistical compendia
but only gathered dust. During that period quantitative-
research-oriented economists(or governments) made
little attempt to convert the data into meaningful economic
measures, thereby testing their quality and relevance to
economic analysis. Until they are so tested, the unused
primary data have little value for economic research and
analysis. In that sense the initial utilization of existing
primary data for formulation of acceptable economic
measures (such as estimates of national product and its
significant components) is like the supply of new pri-
mary data. It provides a base for economic analysis and
quantitative research not previously available.
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Yet, there must also have been an acceleration in the
supply of basic primary data: some in response to pres-
sures generated by the accelerated attempts to provide
meaningful economic measures, and others associated
with the factors that explain the more rapid pace of
quantitative economic research. If greater attempts were
made to combine primary data with other information,
and to convert them into economic measures acceptable
in terms of the underlying basic assumptions and theo-
retical hypotheses, and if in this process the available
primary data proved deficient, such attempts acted as a
stimulus to supplement the existing primary data. In that
sense, work on a comprehensive and articulated estimate
like that of national incomes provides an incentive for,
and a guide to, the collection of missing primary data—
especially if they are crucial. Furthermore, if the tech-
nology of collecting and processing primary data im-
proves markedly, as it did in recent decades, the resulting
reduction in the real costs of deriving the indispensable
summaries may, all other conditions being equal, permit
a corresponding acceleration in the collection and tabu-
lation of new primary data. The acceleration in the sup-
ply of such comprehensive and basic economic measures
as national product and its components must have also
meant an acceleration in the flow of primary data—even
in some developed countries like the United States and
the Scandinavian countries where periodic collection of
various basic nationwide statistics has been a practice
since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
There is little doubt about the acceleration in the flow
of primary data after World War II in the less developed
countries and in many of those developed nations that
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were not distinguished by adequate data collection in the
pre-Worid War II days.
The second question, whether the pace of quantitative
economic research and perhaps of all economic research
also accelerated, is, despite some fuzziness in the defini-
tion of a rate of output of economic research, at least
answerable in terms of inputs. If the supply of primary
data and that of economic measures accelerated, one
could certainly argue that the pace of economic research
was also accelerating. And, unless the total volume of
economic research ceased to grow, or unless the increas-
ing supply of measures and primary data had a diminish-
ing effect on "quantization" of economic analysis, one
would expect an acceleration in the pace of quantitative
economic research. Moreover, one would expect that in
free market economies, in addition to individual scholars,
organized research institutes, and governmental and
quasi-governmental agencies, at least the larger business
units and trade unions would undertake systematic,
quantitative research.
Some evidence is at hand concerning inputs into re-
search. Although a thorough assembly and analysis of
such information is beyond the limits of this paper, I can
cite some figures available for this country. The number
of doctoral degrees in economics (including agricultural
economics) granted by American universities rose from
117 per year for the decade from the mid-1920's to the
mid-1930's to 132 per year in the next decade; it then
jumped to 250 per year in the six years from 1946
through 1951, to 313 in 1957, and was as high as 680
in While a rising proportion of Ph.D. degrees in
For the earlier years see Howard G. Bowen, "Graduate Education
in Economics," American Economic Review, vol. XLIII, no. 4, part
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economics may have been awarded to foreign students,
the acceleration shown above would hardly be reduced
significantly by a reasonable adjustment for this factor.
The United States members of the American Economic
Association (excluding subscribers), estimated to be less
than 2.5 thousand in 1920—1924, rose to about 4 thou-
sand by 1944—1946, and reached 15.6thousandin
1969.6 The impression is that the number of people
actively interested in economics, particularly those highly
qualified for the pursuit of economic research, has grown
at an accelerated rate since World War II, and presum-
ably made possible a higher pace of economic research,
including quantitative. (The above statement disregards
the higher level of training of the more recent products
of graduate education.) A similar impression of ac-
celeration after the late 1930's, and particularly after
World War II, is produced by the marked expansion in
the size of the older professional journals, and by the
addition of a number of new ones.
But it would hardly be useful to try to document
further these rather strong impressions of acceleration in
the supply of data, of economic measures, and in the
pace of quantitative economic research. The illustrations
and comments above should suffice to yield a conclusion
most relevant to any consideration of the National Bu-
reau's program for the future. In the early 1920's, and
perhaps through the first fifteen to twenty years of its
2, September 1953, Table 41, pp. 209—10; for the later years see the
Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey Committee, The Behavioral
andSocial Sciences: Outlook and Needs, EnglewoodCliffs, N.J., 1969,
Table 9-5, p.146.
6Seethe American Economic Review, 1969 Handbook of the
American Econo,nic Association,vol. LIX, no.6, January 1970,
Table 2, pp. 593—594, and Table 4, p. 596.
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existence, the National Bureau was one of the few loci
of quantitative economic research in this country. How-
ever, while remaining a major center for quantitative
economic research, in recent decades it has become a
much smaller part, proportionately, of the total resources
devoted to such research, particularly when one includes,
as one should, research done by government agencies.
Incidentally, the number of books published by the Na-
tional Bureau also indicates a rapid acceleration (see
NBER, Publications 1920—1970, March 1970). Publi-
cations in the general and special series grew from 66 for
1921—1945 to 115 for 1946—1969; with conference
volumes and occasional and technical papers included,
the number of titles is 102 for the earlier period, and 279
for the later. Even so, the rapid expansion in the volume
of quantitative economic research, and the resources in-
vested in it in the country at large, calls for a careful
scrutiny of the particular contribution that the National
Bureau is best prepared to make.
Causes of Acceleration
Of more interest than detailed evidence on the post-
World War II acceleration in the supply of primary data
and economic measures, and the pace of quantitative
economic research, are the factors that might explain
such an acceleration. The explanation, tentative asit
must be, should tell us much about the relation of eco-
nomic research to the major problems that it is meant
to resolve; help us to identify the problems that still
urgently demand, if not solutions (which may be out of
reach), at least the amelioration that economic research
and policy may provide; and permit us to project the
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possible problems and tasks of research for the future.
Since supply of primary data, production of economic
measures, and the pace of quantitative economic re-
search are interrelated, an explanation of the accelera-
tion in one of these complexes explains to a extent
the acceleration in the others. Likewise, the initiative
taken by one social agency, e.g., the government, in in-
tensifying the flow of data, measures, and perhaps the
pace of research, stimulates a higher pace of research
among other agencies, such as academic economists,
nongovernmental research institutions, and business firms
or trade unions. Yet it is next to impossible to treat these
interrelated complexes as one. At the risk of drawing
artificial distinctions, we will discuss (i)the assump-
tion of wider responsibility by government for growth,
stability, and equity in the national economy, and con-
sider what seem to us the major factors that brought
about this increased responsibility, particularly in the
older, free market, developed economies. Since these
factors also stimulate scholarly work, we consider (ii)
how the response of scholarly research to emerging prob-
lems interplays with the change in the scope of govern-
ment responsibility. We then conclude (iii) by consider-
ing the changes in tools, analytical and mechanical, that,
by increasing the efficiency of inputs, may have con-
tributed to the acceleration in the pace of output of
economic research.
(i) The governments of a large proportion of the coun-
tries of the world, unweighted or weighted by population
or product, had, by the late 1960's, professed to assume
responsibility for greater economic growth, full and
stable employment, greater equity, and the like. That
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proportion is larger than in the mid-1940's; and larger
by far than in the early 1920's, when only the newly
organized and struggling USSR could be so classified.
This does not mean that governments were not always
interested in facilitating such goals. But it was generally
assumed in the free market economies that, given a mini-
mal framework of political, legal, and social stability,
greater economic growth, stability, and equity could be
achieved without, rather than with, active government
intervention. Moreover, there was doubt that,if gov-
ernment did assume direct overt responsibility for such
broad aspects of economic performance, it would know
what action to take to discharge such a responsibility.
One thus gets the impression that in the past only
narrowlydefinedeconomic problemsweredirectly
tackled and acted upon by government. Some of these
dealt with monopolies and trusts, the deficiencies of the
banking and credit institutions in preventing economic
crises, the effects of tariffs on specific domestic indus-
tries, labor, and immigration (I am citing examples from
the United States experience). These were problems
created by inadequacies in the prevailing market institu-
tions; and a great deal of economic research was gen-
erated by government when each problem was studied.
But there was no strong conviction that the broader as-
pects of growth, stability, and equity should be a con-
tinuous and active concern of the government; there was
no pressure, like that exerted today, to observe con-
tinuously the rate of growth, level of employment, degree
of price and other stability, of the economy at large. Nor
was there a widely shared belief (recognized in official
legislation) that government has an active responsibility
for these broader aspects of the national economy. It is,
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of course, this shift toward greater government respon-
sibility that resulted in the acceleration of the supply of
primary data, economic measures, and the pace of eco-
nomic research—insofar as government initiative,re-
sources, and pressures were responsible.
What caused this shift? The answer to this question
for Communist countries is automatic, since widespread
control of the economy by the government, in turn domi-
nated by a single political party, is of the essence—with
all the familiar consequences for other economic and
social institutions. The answer to the question for the
many less developed countries that have only recently
acquired political independence may lie in the fact that
the personnel who are staffing the new governments are
those few with some economic training; and these gov-
ernments must play a crucial role in the economic and
social modernization required to accelerate economic
growth.Itisfor the older, developed, free market
economies that the question assumes most interest. In
these countries the rate of growth was more satisfactory;
occasional instabilities were cushioned by a higher stand-
ard of living; and, despite inequalities, inequities were
of far narrower proportions than elsewhere. What factors
then exercised pressure toward assumption of wider
responsibility by the government for these broader as-
pects of economic performance, rather than, as in the
past, leaving them to the working of the market and other
private economic and social institutions?
No definitive answer can be given to the question, if
only because the consequence to be explained—the shift
in overtly accepted responsibility by governments—is
itself not precisely defined. It can range from purely
political and empty eloquence to a far-reaching positive
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action by the government, involving a volume of re-
sources that is large in relation to the rest of the economy.
But if we assume that the shift in question has real sub-
stance, a number of related factors seem to provide an
impetus to and an explanation of it.
Some of these factors lie in the• demonstrated failure of
the economic system, as it operated heretofore in these
free market developed countries under conditions that
were not so exceptional as to warrant the failure. The
impact of the great depression of the 1930's was particu-
larly far-reaching. If, with all the adjustments that had
previously been made in many developed economies, par-
ticularly financial and monetary controls, the contraction
in the capacity of these economies to exploit fully their
resources could be so disastrous, the existing institutional
controls were inadequate and needed to be modified. The
modification might have been limited to new provisions
for unemployment insurance, new plans for supplemen-
tary public works, and the like, if it were not for the
Keynesian theory—partly generated by the pressure of
events on scholarly analysis. This theory indicated that
such a situation could recur if government did not take
care to assure adequacy of final demand at a sufficiently
high level. And once government had to assume an active
role in supplementing private investment opportunities,
questions of economic growth and the implicitly greater
responsibility of government for such growth—if only in
terms of its role in complementing private demand and
private investment opportunities—were bound to arise.
One should also note that the connection between major
depressions and economic growth problems became all
the more evident when the distortion of the political and
economic structure in Hitler's Germany (and the growth
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consequences that followed) was seen as having been
made possible, in large part, by the disaffection of the
population as a result of the prolonged depression.
The other factor was World War II and its aftermath.
Active participation by a country in a major war is
clearly an exceptional set of conditions under which the
"normal" operation of market and other economic and
socialinstitutions must be drastically modified—the
more so, the greater the magnitude of the conflict. The
main reason, of course, is that a large volume of re-
sources must be devoted to the ultimate social gain of
avoiding defeat, and no clear connection with measurable
private gain is apparent. The sovereign government must
assume responsibility for mobilizing such resources, since
it alone can exercise the political and legal authority—
backed by social consensus—to limit activities oriented
toward private gain, and free the resources required for
the socially necessary war task. It is plausible to argue
that the experience during a prolonged major war, the
successful redirection by the government of economic
activity toward a new set of purposes, makes for easier
acceptance even in relatively peaceful times of a more
active role of government with respect to economic
growth, stability, and equity. The effect is stronger if the
postwar years are characterized by international divisive-
ness, with a continuing active international competition
in terms of precisely these broader economic aspects.
The cold war has certainly contributed to the consensus
in favor of greater responsibility of central government
for many tasks in which the national economy plays a
basic role; and in which national security and national
position in the international competition had to be con-
sidered together with domestic aspects of economic per-
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formance—the adequacy of which, in itself, assumed
significance for the country's international position.
The divided state of the post-World War II world,
with the major Communist country, the USSR, viewing
itself as beleaguered by a hostile capitalist ring and using
all its power to widen the base under its control, con-
stituted both a threat and a challenge to the free market
developed countries. It was a threat in that the revolution
in the manufacture and transportation of armaments re-
duced markedly the protection that distance had offered
previously. As a result, a warlike situation tended to be
maintained, with a large volume of resources devoted by
the central government to security-oriented economic
production. The challenge lay in the claim of Communist•
countries that their's was a more effective way to attain
a higher rate of economic growth, a greater degree of
stability, and even wider equity. The validity of such
claims had to be examined, and the overt and hidden
costs appraised. But an even more important response
to the challenge lay in a re-examination of the rate and
conditions of economic growth in the free market econ-
omies themselves; and in a scrutiny of the capacity of
the older institutions to operate under the changed con-
ditions of the new and divided world. For example,
would validity still attach to the theory held by the estab-
lished institutions, that the promotion of competition
would result in success for the more able and productive
members in the race, if there was an ever-present threat
of being called away from this competition into national
defense, or of being destroyed in an atomic holocaust
before the competition was completed? Much of the shift
toward a welfare state in the older established and de-
veloped free market economies was the result of a natural
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trend from legal to political, and from political to eco-
nomic equality. However, much of the shift in the post-
World War II years was also the result of a recognition
that economic inequalities were no longer justifiable on
the grounds of their presumptive contribution to produc-
tivity in the market-oriented part of the system, in view
of the increasing weight of the required contribution to
other high-priority social purposes, with respect to which
certain aspects of economic inequality are destructive,
not constructive. Just as it proved important to control
capital investment and channel savings, without leaving
the decision entirely to the private sector of the economy,
so it became necessary to be concerned with inequalities
in personal income generated by the competitive char-
acteristics of private enterprise. And the underlying in-
ternational, intersystem competition and challenge had
obvious effects on the relations between the developed
market economies and the less developed countries,
many of which were former colonies. The evolution of
new forms of international transfer of resources from
the rich developed to the poor less developed countries
also meant a new type of activity and responsibility for
the government, because of the inadequacy of the ordi-
nary channels of private enterprise.
If the Great Depression, the ensuing war, and the
post-World War II intersystem competition in the world
were among the more obvious factors responsible for
the shift in the free market developed economies toward
greater responsibility by the governments for economic
growth, stability, and equity, two other groups of fac-
tors, less conspicuous and noticeable, may also have
contributed. One was connected with the rapid develop-
ment of technology, the major permissive source of mod-
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emeconomic growth, to levels at which innovations
could have highly potent and dangerous implications.
The marked advances in mechanical power at the dis-
posal of human beings, in rapidity of penetration into
the various areas on this planet, and recently beyond it,
resulted in diseconomies of mass output under private
enterprise that called for remedies possible only with
intervention of public authority. Moreover, and even
more important, these advances created opportunities
for innovations with so much power, and hence so great
a danger of misuse, that it was unsafe to leave them in
the hands of private enterprise, even if the latter were
capable and willing to take the economic risks involved.
Thus the technological innovation, war-originated, that
resulted in a designed production of atomic energy, car-
ried with it such great danger that careful government
decisions were required on how its mass exploitation
could be safely developed by private enterprise. Space
exploration, another essentially war-originated innova-
tion, involved such a huge volume of inputs and was so
far removed from market exploitation that only the gov-
ernment could undertake it—although some of its by-
products are already exploitable for private market pur-
poses. The problem that would arise if and when the
present work on DNA makes it possible to control the
genetic capacities of future generations is another good
illustration of a technological innovation that would re-
quire control by a socially responsible government. One
might, in general, argue that any major technological and
scientific innovation, which has dangerous by-products
or bestows too much power on its users, cannot be en-
trusted to private enterprise without careful supervision,
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and must be controlled by the government until these
dangers can be observed and counteracted.
The second additional complex of factors that might
have contributed to assumption by governments of a
more active concern with the broader aspects of eco-
nomic performance is the progress made in the very
course of study of the new conditions and the new data,
which resulted in revisions of the older theories that im-
plicitlylimited government responsibilityto keeping
order and dealing with immediate emergencies. To illus-
trate: if the main source of economic growth is assumed
to be material capital, and hence savings, and govern-
ment can only encourage such savings and their efficient
utilization, its responsibility is limited to the institutional
changes that serve this means of optimizing economic
growth. However,ifthe major source of economic
growth is technological change, and if the latter can be
facilitated by research, particularly the type that, while
basic and immensely productive in the long run, yields
results that cannot be appropriated by private interests,
then the government must undertake the task, or finance
it. To illustrate further: the long-term growth rate can
differ widely among free market economies, as it has in
fact done during the postwar decades. If these differ-
ences reflect a variety of policies pursued by govern-
ments, i.e., if the process of economic growth, income
distribution, and temporal stability, are not subject to
some inexorable laws over which intervention by govern-
ment can have no useful influence—there is no reason
to limit in advance the concern of government with the
broader aspects of economic activity.
What is most relevant in this connection is that, while
the progress of tested study of observable growth be-
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havior of even free market economies tends to remove
limits on the possible contribution of government, it also
tends to weaken any theories that claim inexorable laws
of behavior for private enterprise or the indubitable vir-
tue of some ideological forms of social and economic
organization. And this abandonment of dogmatic notions
leads both to an acceleration of quantitative research
(and of other types of research) and to the pragmatic
initiative by governments in assuming responsibility for
the basic performance of the economy. It is hardly an
accident that Adam Smith was scornful of what political
arithmetic could teach him, not so much because its em-
pirical standards were so low but because he firmly be-
lieved that the truth of what he thought made for the
wealth of nations needed no empirical support. To be
sure, his thesis, with its implications, was based in part
on the historical experience of Western European so-
cieties as he saw them; and he was quite sensitive to the
realistic conditions that might limit the full application
of the principle to specific problems. But the impression
remains that it was only with Maithus, whose thesis was
applied to sources of poverty (rather than of wealth),
that the search for preventive checks and a more consist-
ent interest in observational data began. It is no accident
that, in Communist countries, the dogmatic conviction
concerning the rightness of a special type of control and
organization of the economy is accompanied not merely
by neglect of various aspects of quantitative economic
analysis but also by direct prohibition of the wide range
of quantitative economic study pursued in societies less
committed in this fashion. The variety of growth experi-
ence revealed by further study in the United States and
other developed countries, and the abandonment of sim-
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plistic and dogmatic notions concerning causes of eco-
nomic progress and related requirements as to income
distribution, or tolerance of income instabilities, con-
tributed to the more pragmatic, and hence potentially
wider, concern of governments with economic growth,
stability, and equity.
(ii) The problems and challenges posed by domestic
and international history that induced governments of
free market economies to assume wider responsibility for
the economy were naturally a stimulus also to economists
and research institutions outside of government. If the
more intensive analysis of new data and measures estab-
lished a more pragmatic view, one less constrained by
dogmatic notions of what government activity could
contribute, it was clearly the type of research pursued by
nongovernment agencies that could have this effect of
weakening old theoretical notions and viewpoints. In
general, and because it is too closely involved with cur-
rent problems, economic research under government aus-
pices is likely to be conservative, following established
definitions and measures and applying them to current
problems, often accepting without question the bases of
the measures themselves. Few economic measures have
been adopted by government agencies in the older free
market societies until they had been advanced and ex-
perimented with in the scholarly literature. The experi-
ence in this country with estimates of national income
and product,input-outputapproaches,flow-of-funds
measures, and even periodic sample surveys, clearly illus-
trates the sequence from academic and research institute
scholarship to government use.
But the stimulus to quantitative economic research
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provided by the expanded responsibility and activities of
the governments is only part of the story. I have the im-
pression that, in this country (and perhaps elsewhere),
the acceleration in quantitative economic research was
not only the result of government expansion, either di-
rectly or through the granting of funds. After all, major
economic problems that called for more economic re-
search, quantitative research included, have always ex-
isted, but they have not apparently produced the accel-
eration in the pace of economic research suggested by
the increase in numbers of potential scholars in this
country, cited above.
In fact, the acceleration in the numbers of trained
economists was part of a much wider movement, affect-
ing all levels of advanced study in a wide variety of
disciplines. Limiting ourselves to the numbers of Ph.D.
degrees awarded, as a rough indication of the new po-
tential research scholars, we find that the total acceler-
ated at a more rapid rate than the number of economists
—the latter forming but a small fraction, ranging from
about 3.5 to about 6 per cent of the total. The average
share of Ph.D. degrees in economics in the total (arith-
metic means of annual shares) was 5.8 per cent in the
decade from the mid-1920's to the mid-1930's; 4.8 per
cent in the following decade; back to 5.7 per cent in the
six years from 1946 through 1951 (the period when the
great acceleration in numbers began); dropped to 3.6
per cent in 1957; and was only 3.4 per cent in 1967 (see
the sources cited above). Furthermore, from 1957 to
1967, the share of economics Ph.D.'s in the total for all
behavioral and social sciences declined from 18.8 to
17.4 per cent; and political science, psychology and edu-
cational psychology, and sociology (including rural so-
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ciology) showed a greater rise than economics (the lat-
ter including agricultural economics)Thissuggests that
the acceleration in numbers of trained potential contrib-
utors to economic research was part of a wider move-
ment, and cannot be attributed to the nature of the new
economic problems or to the greater responsibility of
government for the broader aspects of the economy.
The causes of this wider expansion in higher educa-
tion, particularly in its most advanced stages, would
form a fascinating topic for investigation. Offhand, one
would expect to see it as a response to the much higher
valuation placed on its contribution to society and to the
individual—a reflection of the connection between the
recent technological innovations and advanced stages of
scientific and experimental knowledge, and the more ad-
vanced methods of social and behavioral sciences, as
applied to policy problems within both the public and
private sectors. This connection would be reflected in
the higher compensation to individuals with advanced
knowledge in the arts and sciences, as well as in the
extensive financial help to graduate students and other
advanced learners. Economic inducements at the under-
graduate level of education must also have been greater,
Seethe sources cited in footnotes5 and 6. With the annual
number ofPh.D.'s ineconomicsincreasing from132 in.thedecade
from1934—35 to 1944—45 to 680 in 1967 and the growth in the total
number ofPh.D.'s even greater,the contribution of thelarger
numbers of the relevant age groups must have been quite small. The
most relevant group, men age 25—34, increased from 1940 to 1970
by less than 20 per cent, much less than the total population because
of the low birth rates in the late 1930's and early 1940's. For the
underlying data seeHistoricalStatisticsofthe United States, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1960; Continuation to 1962, Washington, D.C., 1965;
and Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971, Washington, D.C.,
1971.
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to widen appreciably the base from which the movement
into more advanced training was possible. Such wider
inducements were probably provided by differential re-
turns in connection with years of education and by lower
real costs associated with a higher level of per capita
product and income for an increasing proportion of the
population. One could also argue that, given the high-
income propensity of demand for education as a con-
sumption good, higher per capita income alone, without
the favorable economic differentials associated with years
of education, would have brought about an acceleration
of secondary and higher education in the post-World
War II period, after the backlog of the depressed 1930's
and the restrictive conditions of World War II. One
could also argue that the demand for education as a
consumption good was particularly high in recent dec-
ades, when better understanding of the events in those
years of rapid change placed high value on education—
not as a means of earning extra income but as a means
of orienting oneself in a difficult world. If such orienta-
tion required the equivalent of a good college education,
the latter incidentally provided a rapidly widening base
for the more advanced types of training and preparation
for research, reducing in a sense the cost of information
needed for such choices.
Adequate analysis of the acceleration of advanced
education in almost all disciplines, of its effect on the
pace of research productive of current and future inno-
vations, and of the several reasons for it, would involve
comparative study of a number of developed economies
that have institutions permitting effective free choice by
individuals. Such a study is beyond the limits of this
paper and of my capacities. But it is useful to note here
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that the quickening in the growth of numbers of new
potential contributors to economic research, including
the quantitative, is part of a broader movement, not lim-
ited to the effects of a shift toward greater government
responsibility even in the free market economies. The
implications for our topic are twofold.
First, regardless of the possible continuation of such
acceleration, the proximate future may be affected by the
innovational changes that the larger body of research
scholars is likely to generate. And the rate at which it
generates such innovations may rise, even if the marginal
contribution of the larger body is lower than that of a
smaller body (although it need not be, in a relatively
inexhaustible field), so long as the decline in marginal
efficiency is more than compensated for by the larger
numbers and possible economies of scale. Thus, as we
look ahead to the problems of economic research, we
ought to be thinking in terms of a greater rate of scien-
tific and technological innovation—rather than assume
that the high rate of the immediate past represents a kind
of plateau or is transitory.
The second implication is more closely related to the
possible immediate prospects for economic research. If
the numbers of new, highly trained, potential research
scholars accelerated more rapidly in related social sci-
ence and behavioral disciplines than in economics, the
research output of these disciplines may also have ac-
celerated. Since this output is closely related to the eco-
nomic, particularly in the analysis of long-term problems
of growth and structure, it would presumably have valid-
ity and relevance for economic research proper. Indeed,
the increasing concern of quantitative economic studies
with demographic aspects of economic growth, with the
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effects of political structure, with discrimination and
stratification, clearly indicates that the nature of the
problems is breaking down the traditionally narrow dis-
cipline boundaries. One, therefore, must consider the
possibility that the output of research, quantitative and
other, in the related social sciences and behavioral disci-
plines has accelerated substantially, and that its more
effective utilization may be an important prerequisite in
any considered plans and prospective programs for eco-
nomic research.
(iii) There is little question that, over the twenty-five
years since World War II, tremendous strides have been
made in the methods of collecting and summarizing pri-
mary data, and subjecting it to elaborate computations
and manipulations of increasing complexity. Strides have
also been made in developing rules of inference from
quantitative data, and in building models, simple or com-
plex, that simulate what appear to be the most relevant
structural and behavior characteristics of the national
economies or of significant sectors within them, thus pro-
viding more formal and more discriminating alternatives
for organizing and interpreting a vast variety of economic
measures. Given, in addition, the acceleration in the
numbers of potential research economists with increas-
ingly advanced training, we could assume an increased
pace of quantitative economic research. Indeed, we might
even interpret it as an acceleration in the output of eco-
nomic research, if we could assume that, over the last two
decades and a half, neither the rise in efficiency nor the
complexity of the analytical problems with reference to
which we can judge the "finishedness" of the output of
quantitative economic research had changed from what
it had been in the past.
54Quantitative Economic Research: Trends and Problems
The above statement refers to three, quite distinct,
possible sources of rise in efficiency of research inputs.
The, first is the material technology for collecting and
handling primary data and for any derivative measures.
Considering 'the major technological changes after World
War II in the field of communication, calculation, and
reproduction of information (some based on war-induced
types of innovation), one may conclude that the con-
tribution from this source to efficiency of inputs in
quantitative research grew at a distinctly higher rate in
recent than in the pre-Worid War II decades.
The second source is represented by the rapid ad-
vances that have been made in the theory of inferences
from quantitative data. The latter are now being viewed
(as they are in much of statistical theory) as reflections
of a formally structured universe that can be reduced by
analysis to a mixture of invariant and variant compo-
nents. Distinctions are thus made between approxima-
tions to central tendencies and normal variance, or the
different structure of small sample variances, or the ap-
plication of mathematical tools to cyclical and trend
components and the like, or the application of other
mathematical tools of particular promise to specific eco-
nomic behavior patterns that lend themselves to mean-
ingful constraints. The resulting tools—some statistical,
some econometric, some elements in formal economic
theory—can hardly be reduced to comparable units for
measuring the additions over the last twenty-five years
against those in the preceding decades; and my knowl-
edge of the field is far too limited to permit tenable judg-
ments. Yet I have the impression, supported by chronol-
ogy of advance in the theory of sampling, design, and
statistical inference, the emergence and flowering of
econometrics as a subdiscipline, and developments in
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mathematical economics, that there is an acceleration in
the rate at which the stock of these tools has grown. It
seems to me that this stock has proved, after sufficient
testing, to have substantially increased the efficiency of
post-World War II quantitative economic research.
The third possible source of greater efficiency is the
formulation and multiplication of substantive, theoreti-
cal hypotheses, relevant to observable reality, which per-
force stimulate closely associated economic research.
Keynesian general theory was neither an innovation in
material technology of data collection or computation,
nor did it constitute an advance in the methodology of
statistical inference, or in econometrics, or the applied
mathematical tools of the corresponding division of eco-
nomic theory. Yet it proved to be a great stimulus to
quantitative economic research, primarily through the
emphasis that it placed on savings and capital invest-
ment, and on the factors that determined these two com-
ponents of total product (viewed at the use level) and of
total income (viewed at the allocation level). This state-
ment is true also of other hypotheses and models that
have emerged in discussions concerning major factors in
aggregate growth—at least when these hypotheses or
models specify the factors sufficiently to permit estab-
lishing their quantitative counterparts, and are not de-
stroyed at the outset by what littleis already known
of certain quantitative aspects of the economic growth
of nations. All such hypotheses and theories are attempts
at new generalizations, either cancelling or adding to
those already available; and their implications, either for
broad judgments of the course of economic affairs or for
more specific policy, are sufficiently intriguing to war-
rant quantitative analysis. A greater supply can poten-
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tially raise the efficiency of quantitative economic re-
search by providing stimuli and guidance, and thus hold
promise of more meaningful results.
We cannot state firmly that the flow of hypotheses and
theories relevant to quantitative economic research deal-
ing with broader aspects of national economies was more
rapid during the post-World War II years than previ-
ously. However, we do feel that the rate of addition of
such hypotheses as could serve to guide quantitative re-
search, because they were formulated in a more easily
testable way, was higher than in the past, when our
knowledge of the quantitative outlines of national econ-
omies was so limited. And it may well be that the same
impression would be conveyed if we were to look at many
major aspects of economic analysis. If the pace was
greater for theorizing about the performance of the
national economy, it would have its ramifications in af-
fecting such major aspects as industrial organization,
supply of natural resources, fiscal and monetary policy
and theory, and international trade and capital move-
ments.
All of this may mean a greater pace of intermediate
output of economic research, of economic measures, par-
tial and partially tested hypotheses, interpretations of
new stretches of economic experience, and revised inter-
pretations of some old stretches. But what this means
for the pace of finished output of economic research, i.e.,
generalizations tested and established within conditions
that assure sufficient relevance in application to realistic
prediction, either for better understanding of what is
likely to occur or for better evaluation of the effects of
policy, depends on one's judgments of relevance and
realism. These would vary with the nature and scope of
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the economic process or structure that forms the focus
of such a generalization. Thus, the generalization con-
cerning the cyclical responsiveness of graduated personal
income taxes in developed free market economies with
established income tax traditions, and on the assumption
of realistic conditions concerning income changes, price
changes, and the like, can probably be put into a rela-
tively finished form—given the supply of primary data,
the econometric tools for analysis, and the battery of
hypotheses concerning cyclical sensitivity of various types
of income and the relation of the latter to income level.
(This may be too optimistic a judgment, but let me use
it as an illustration.) On the other hand, it is difficult to
think of any tested generalization, significantly specific
to permit the quantitative prediction of aggregate growth,
or even of changes in the structural parameters in the
course of growth (of, let us say, the free market econ-
omy) that may be viewed as even approximating a
"finished" product—notwithstanding the multitude of
such tentative generalizations, cross-section studies, and
econometric exercises. At any rate, here we are in the
area of difficult judgments, which should perhaps be
advanced only with elaborate documentation, not feas-
ible in this paper. If suffices to point out, in concluding
our discussion of the acceleration in the pace of quanti-
tative economic research, that, in addition to the changed
position of governments (particularly in the developed
free market economies) and acceleration in the supply
of highly trained potential economic research scholars,
there was also, a quickening of the pace of improvement
in the material technology of collection and handling of
quantitative data, in the methodological tools for analysis
of a wide variety of complex types of measurement, and
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possibly also in the flow of theories, sufficiently well for-
mulated to guide quantitative economic research in more
"productive" directions.
4. IDENTIFYING MAJOR RESEARCH
PROBLEMS
Persistence of Unsolved Problems
The greater supply of data and economic measures
and the accelerated flow of hypotheses and pace of re-
search do not mean that we are now in the happy situa-
tion of having answered all major questions and pro-
vided an adequate basis for realistic prediction and opti-
mal economic policy. It only means that we have learned
a great deal, enough perhaps to force abandonment of
earlier simpler and more restrictive theories and to re-
place them with new hypotheses, more relevant but still
based upon many simplifying and restrictive assump-
tions. It means that there is a basis for a greater con-
sensus on the major changes that occurred in the econ-
omy and perhaps on some of the major factors that
contributed to these changes. And it means that the
greater supply of tested data and of realistic partial hy-
potheses permits a better evaluation of the implications
of the changes as a guide to action. It also means a
better choice of policy priorities and perhaps of specific
policies—insofar as better knowledge of the basic frame-
work and changes in the economy, and more tested
analysis of policies, can affect both the overall priorities
and specific policy choices. But acceleration in the sup-
ply of data and in the pace of research brings forth a
variety of unsolved major problems calling for further
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